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THE AFGHAN FRONTIER. 
TEE SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH NOT DELIVERED 
BY 
S I R  G. C A M B P E L L .  
AFTER the announcement that the Government 
proposed to retain the routes between Afghanistan 
and India recently occupied by our troops, I obtained 
by ballot a place for the following motion : " To call 
" attention to the difficult and expensive character 
" of the frontier now occupied on the north-west of 
" India; and to move, That, unless Her Majesty's 
" Government are prepared to occupy Ghuznee 
" and Cabul, it is not desirable to entangle Her 
" Majesty's Army in the rery mountainous country 
" between the Upper Punjaub and those places, 
" which is entirely without lateral communications 
'& and inhabited by independent tribes never eon- 
'' quered;" but owing to the unexpected effect of 
a technical rule I was not able to move it. Mean- 
while the subject has grown in my mind, beyond 
the reasonable limits of a speech. I have therefore 
reduced my views to writhg, and the result is 
printed with this. In  case I should succeed in 
getting on my motion, I hope those who may care - 
for the subject will take this as rend. 
G. C. 
May 15, 1879. 
Pri~ted, for Private Circulation 
BY 
EDWABJ) STANFORD, 56, GHARING CROSS, S.W. 
C O N T E N T S .  
PIOE.  
THE SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR . . . . 1 
THE PRESENT SI UATION . . . .  - 4  
THE HISTORY OF AFGH&VISTAN . 7 a, . . 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFGHANISTAX . . 1 4  -a  
+-I THE PEOPLES OF AFGE~NISTAX . . . . 19  
THE DENAND FOR RESIDLNTS . . 31 
THE SCIEXTIFIC FRONTIER . " .  . 38 
POSSIBLE ARRAAVGEHENTS . 60 \ i s  
THE LAST RESORT . . . . 68 x; \' 
d 
SUXKARY . . . . . 80 tf 
FRONTIER. 
e IT seems strange to the generation that learned 
the lessons of the first Afghan war, then sunk so 
deep into the national heart, that a second similar 
war should have been waged for precisely the same 
object, namely, the establishment of a friendly 
power on the north-west frontier of India. Then, as 
now, we sought to establish such a power by fair 
means or foul-by persuasion if possible, and failing 
that, by force, But so it is : we have' embarked 
-3' in such a war, and we must face the questions 
> ; involved in it. 
1 ,. 
q .;" 
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THE SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR. 
h. 
.r\n, Before this war I have often expressed my own 
views regarding the north-west frontier; they may 
b be put in very brief compass. I have always 
thought and said that if the mountains of Afghan- 
43% istan had been occupied by a people in any degree 
a resembling those of the Himalayas,-if the Afghans 
i had in any degree resembled in character -the 
'5 people of Cashmere or of the hill country of the \ 
1 
t f "  
2 
Hiangra, Sirnln, or Iiulnaon districts, or even those 
of Nepaul-I should have thought it extremely 
1 desirable that Fve should in some shape occupy that 
country and so complete our defences ; but we 
know by painful experience that the Afghans are a 
people of a totally different character-turbulent- 
bred from infancy to the use of arms-and with a 
passion for independence in which they are exceeded 
+ 1 , 
by no people in this world. This love of inde- 
pendence is such as to make them intolerant, not 
only of foreign rule, but almost of any national, I I
tribal or family rule. They are a people among I 
whom every man would be a law unto himself. 
1 
Experience has shown, too, that these traits are 
not of a passing kind ; the Afghans are not to be 
, 
tamed by subjection and peace ; nothing induces 1 
them to  surrender that love of independence which 
seems to be the essence of their nature. That 
being the character of the people occupying so 
difficult and inaccessible a country, I have thought 
that the difficulties and expense of any attempt to 
meddle with that country far outweigh the advan- 
tages. I have thought, too, that the passion for 
independence of a people occupying such a country I 
is the best safeguard of our frontier, so long as the 
Afghans ha\-e reason to think that we, taught by c #  
experience, are less aggressive and less likely to i 
encroach upon them than their other neighbours. 
Of these neighbours the most formidable are no 
donbt the Russians. Some day, possibly, the 
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Russians may be formidable both to Afghanistan 
and to India ; but at present, as I have always 
said, separated as they are in Turkestan from their 
resources by immense and pathless deserts, they 
certainly are not dangerous to us and cannot be 
dangerous till they have established themselves 
much more thoroughly, and have constructed rail- 
ways and other means of communication to the 
foot of the Afghan mountains on their side, as com- 
pletely as we have constructed or are constructing 
such communications on our side. That being so, 
I have said that we may well play a waiting game; 
that it is not for us to fly to  dangers and expenses 
which are certain in order t o  avoid future dangers 
which are uncertain. For it is not certain that 
Russia will hold together for another fifty years as 
a great military empire ; that she will establish a 
complete dominion in Central Asia; that she will 
find the means of constructing great communica- 
tions in vast territories which are as unproductive 
as India is productive. I think that recent events 
in RGssia go very far indeed to fortify this view. 
 ere is evidently a great seething and fermen- 
tation there which may any day lead to revolution 
and disruption, and must at any rate greatly 
hinder the development of a strong aggressive 
power. 
No doubt it is in every way most desirable that 
we sllould be on friendly terms with the Afghans. 
It always is desirable that we should cultivate 
1 "  
friendly relations with our neighbours -and I 
would certainly cultivate those relations with the 
Afghans, as far as the tribal divisions among them- 
selves and the complications and uncertainties of 
bheir mode of government mill permit. The in- 
stability of 811 Afghan rule and Afghan rulers is, 
however, such that I confess that I did not like 
even the approaches which Lord Lawrence and 
Lord Mayo made towards political intimacy with 
the ruler of Cabul. T,ooking t o  the position of 
that potentate and to the Afghan character, I have 
thought that for political purposes i t  would be 
better to leave him to come to us when he wanted 
our countenance and assistance, rather than that 
me should show our anxiety to deal with him. 
When you appproach an Afghan to make terms 
with him, you are very apt to turn his head, and 
you find the more he gets the more he wants. 
THE PRESENT SITUATION. 
Recent events have no doubt very much altered 
the situation. Whether one may or may not 
approve of the steps by which the present war was 
brought about, that war is a fact which we must 
take into account in dealing with this question. 
Looking at the enormous difficulties aad expense 
of n permanent occupation of Afghanistan, I still 
think that it would be better t,hat me should return 
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1, I still 
1 return 
io  our own Indian border ; but I admit that it 
would now require very great moral courage to do 
this. The difficulties of our position have been 
immensely increased by what has lately passed; 
and if before this war there were arguments in 
favour of an advance, no doubt those arguments 
are now immensely strengthened. We have come 
. __
more into collision with the independent tribes than 
with the ruler of Cabul, and things have passed 
which must go very far to create among those 
tribes a feeling of burning hostility towards us. 
' We have caused the breaking up of the government 
established at Cabul, such as it mas ; and we seem . 
to have insisted on lopping off further portions of 
the Csbul territory,-a measure which must very 
greatly increase the difficulty of any ruler of 
A 
Cabul to exercise any semblance of power over the 
country at  large. After what has recently passed 
we must expect that the Afghans, for a very long 
time to come, will think that the Russians are a less 
evil than ourselves, and as against us they will be a t  
any time ready to throw themselves into the arms 
of Russia. Above all, what I fear is that, whereas 
up to this time the Afghan tribes are provided'with 
nothing better than the old-fashioned firearms, it 
., can hardly be but that in these days of cheap arms 
of precision7 which enterprising traders are so 
ready to disseminate over the world, they must 
before long become possessed of such arms. Even 
if peace and the semblance of political friendliness 
6 
should be maintained between the Russiaas'and 
ourselves, we can hardly hope that the Russians 
mill or can stop the traffic in arms for our benefit. 
I colifess that I think the strongest argument for 
deal* with the Afghans at the present time is 
that me tnay do so before they obtain arms of pre- 
cision. Under these circumstances, I a m  not 
sanguine enough to hope that Her Majesty's 
Governnlent will go back to  the lines which they 
~vould have done better never to have left. What 
pl-esent indications lead me to fear is that, situated 
as they are, with very much on their hands, and 
di~.ided between those who mould go very far and 
those who mould cautiously hold back, they are 
halting and in danger of a half-and-half ~o l icy ,  
~vhich to my judgment is the worst of all. My 
experience is, that if you have to deal with hornets 
only two courses are possible-one, not to stir them 
up or aggravate them, the other to smoke them 
out and take the nest. To stir them up, put your 
hand into the nest and keep it there is not  what a 
vise man vould do ; yet that is what I am afraid 
of, if our present position is maintained. 
At any rate, I think it must be apparent that this 
questiou which has troubled us so long is not now 
t o  be met by temporary expedients. W e  must 
take a. broad view of the whole subject and t ry  t o  
spttle it on lines that shall be lasting. It is in that 
spirit that I desire to approach it. The subject is 
one which has interested and occupied me for 
upwards of thirty years. It is just thirty years ago 
that in the year 1849 I put forth views on the 
subject which attracted a good deal of attention at 
the time; and I trust that after having matured 
those views in the interval from that time to this, I 
may not be presumptuous in submitting them for 
what they are worth. 
r. 
The first fallacy against which I think it is 
necessary that there should be warning, is that of 
supposing that we can find or establish a strong 
and friendly government of Afghanistan with whom 
we may make terms. My belief is that in truth no 
such government is now possible. It is, as it were, 
contrary to the nature of things.! To explain 
that view I must make a very brief historical 
retrospect. 
b 
THE HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN. 
Till very modern times no such country as 
Afghanistan was known to the world. Nost of 
the territory which we now call Afghanistan was 
part of the province known to the 'Persians 
and Arabs as Khorassan. 'I he Afghans were only 
6.~6 known as tribes occupying some of the more hilly 
and inaccessible parts of the country, and from 
arnong whom successive rulers have drawn mer- 
cenary soldiers, many of whoin have colonized in 
India. These Afghan tribes were not. found in 
tIlr-. Ckllcasia11 range to the north of the country, 
l iot olllJ- in the mountains further south* Their 
origin is a puzzle to ethnographers. They are 
eerbkly people quite different from the Persians 
nan the orac side and the Indians on the other. 
Tllejr hrnpikgre is not a mixture of the languages 
of" tlapir I I ~ ~ S ~ I ~ O U ~ S ,  but a distinct language with 
very nr:arked cl~aracteristics of iks own, though it is 
p.rbr1c.rmal9y classed as an Aryan tongue. These are - 
tlf<;* E,e~pdlk: rrllorn we, using the Persian term 
kcnrcely kno~t-n to themselves, call Afghans, 
\v%ailt. t%ley can themselves Pathans or Puktans 
wtsa% tlltis Eringtlage Pashtoo or Puktoo. They 
have n n a ~ t h  that they are descended from the 
tJtqs=;"d, 11ut the fact is that the Mahommedan 
wpligiorr is SO I P ~ U C ~  connected with Jewish origins 
rttat a goml many Xahommedan tribes claim a 
JcavLh tlexwcent; as do a good many others a 
c%c.sce.ra-t fronr Seeunder or Alexander. Their more 
diiaimnct traditions ascribe their ori,oinal seat to  the 
nar~alnlt:rins of Oflore. but it is not very clear where 
tha t  is-ng,l,nrerntly to the north-west of Candahar. 
At  ;uky nte .  in times before history they had 
wcaaj~icd s89 the IlilI country east of Caadahar and 
( ; P L ~ ~ Z I ~ ~ C ,  and thence to the borders of India. I t  
-wars not. Ew~x-eyer, till comparatively modern times 
-*?. since the beginning of the sixteenth centQry, 
- -%kt t h y  adrmrced across tbe Cabul River 
c ~ ~ ~ g a i t : b a !  not 0 1 . 1 ~ ~  the ~ d e ~ s  of Jellalabad and 
I'ithrwiir ~ i i l ~ l  same of the sllbmontane countly, 
but also some of the lower Caucasian country 
north of the Cabul River. I t  is certain that 
Peshawur and the Ehyber hills and the valleys to 
the north were originally an Indian country. The 
peaks of the " Suffeid Hoh 7 7  range still bear Indian 
names : and to this day Swat and the other 
Afghan valleys north of the Cabul River are only 
occupied by the Afghans as the dominant race, 
while most of the land is tilled by an inferior race 
of Indian blood in the position of serfs, who are 
the aborigines of the country and seem to be 
allied to the neighbouring races of Cashmere. 
The Afghan population has neve-t occupied the 
higher parts of the Caucasian range further north, 
and the hilly country immediately north and west 
of Cabul is still held by other races. Even in the 
valley of Cabul and the rest of the more open 
country the Afghans seem to be still rather a 
dominant tribe than the mass of tillers of the soil. 
The accessible parts of the country have generally 
not been ruled over by Afghans at all, but by 
other and greater powers. We knew that this 
mas so from the earliest dawn of history. Great 
empires have occupied the country a t  large, while 
the tribes have maintained a rude independence 
in their hills; in frequent collision with the greater 
powers by whom they were surrounded, but 
!generally bribed and utilized by those powers. 
The modern Afghanistan was part of ancient 
Persia-then came the Greek dominion, which we 
know to have lasted a long time, though its 
history is lost ; then the revived Persian empire ; 
then the Arab dominion ; and then the invasion 
and occupation of the country by Turk and 
Mongol conquerors. Mahmoud of Ghuznee, %he 
first conqueror of India, no doubt took his title 
from a place in Afghanistan, but we know that he 
was a Turk who had come there as a conqueror, 
and thence conquered India. Subsequently 
some dynasties of Afghan origin ruled in India, 
but these dynasties were founded by soldiers 
of fortune who had risen to power under the 
Turks. The Moguls, too, acquired Afghanistan, 
or rather, I should say, the country me now call 
Afghanistan, first, and India afterwards ; and 
while they reigned over India they still held most 
of the Afghan country, by means of the resources 
which they drew from India. Much trouble they 
had in dealing with the Afghans, and it was only 
the revenues of their great foreign territories 
which enabled them to keep the tribes in check, 
partly by bribing them and partly by controlling 
them; but sometimes they wholly failed to control 
them and suffered great disasters at the hands of 
the tribes. They very much utilized the Afghan 
soldiers, as the English Government did the , 
Highlanders of Scotland. It may be said that 
under all the Mahommedan rulers of India the 
Afghan soldiers very much took the place which is 
now occupied by our European soldiers; and thus 
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it was that they found their advantage in serving 
the emperors. It must also be remembered that 
both the employers and the employed professed 
the same Mahommedan religion, and altogether the 
emperors had much more in common with their 
subjects than we can have,-so that they had in 
that respect great advantage over us. The 
Afghans who settled in India became Indianized 
and civilized, and acted as a sort of military 
colonists in support of the Mahommedan govern- 
ment. 
In  the decadence of the &Iogul government the 
Afghan tribes again asserted their independence, 
and the great Ghilzye tribe at  one time overran 
Persia, but the Persians again under Nadir Rhah 
conquered and annexed Afghanistan. It was after 
the death of Nadir Shah that the Afghan Ahrned 
Shah Duranee established a kingdom of his own, 
and then we first hear of the country of Afghan- 
istan. Ahmed Shah became a great conqueror, 
claimed the title of Shah or King, and as we know 
repeatedly invaded India, broke the Mahratta 
power in the year 1759, and apparently had India 
at his feet. It has always been one of the greatest 
puzzles of history why he failed to take advantage 
of that position. I believe the truth was that his 
do&ion had so little strength or union among 
his own Afghans at home, that it was inherently 
weak. He was strong to conquer for a time, but he 
could not keep his forces together. Under his 
12 
successors his kingdom soon became very weak. 
Although he had left Dehli to the Mogul, and had 
abandoned the Empire of India, still the country to  
the west of Delhi-the Punjaub and all the plains 
of the Indus, with Cashmere and the hill country 
to the north, -mere attached to Afghanistan. But 
very coon the Sikhs made themselves independent 
in the Eastern Punjaub; and when in the present a 
century Runjeet Singh rose to power as a great Sikh 
ruler, and established a regularly disciplined army, he 
soon conquered the Western and Southern Punjaub, 
Mooltan and Cashmere ; and eventually crossing 
the Indus he conquered the proper Afghan country 
of Peshawur, Kohat, and the rest at the foot of the 
hills. Sinde fell away from the Afghan kingdom, 
Beloochistan became independent, and altogether 
it was sadly reduced. 
Without the command of money it is impossible 
to control the Afghan tribes, and so it was that 
when the dominions of the King of Cabul were 
thus lopped off, they eipelled their king and he 
became a refugee in our territory, till we tried to 
reinstate him and brought him to an unhappy 
death a t  Cabul, in 1842, under circumstances which 
are well known. After the expulsion of the Shah, 
the family of Dost Mahomed did not claim the 
title of King, but were content with the lower title 
of Ameer or chief. In  truth there was not one 
Ameer, but several Ameers. Cabul was under 
one rtder, Candahar under another, Herat under 
another, and 
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Mahomed was a very remarkable man, and he 
gradually recovered all these places, but it was not 
till the very last days of his life that he took Herat. 
Neither he nor ally other Ameer have made the 
least pretence of ruling over the great mass of the 
Afghan tribes who hold the country adjoining 
C 
India from Swat in the north to Quettah in the 
south. I mean, not only that they have exercised 
no effective rule, but that there has been no 
pretence of any feudal sovereignty over the tribes; 
on the contrary, unable to restrain or influeace 
them, the Ameer has always disclaimed all respon- 
sibility for them. 
When, after the vicissitudes and changes of 
fortune subsequent to Dost Mahomed's death, 
Shere Ali at last established himself as the suc- 
1 
cessor of the Dost, he certainly showed some 
personal strength and courage, if not other 
qualities. With the aid of the money and arms 
which he obtained from us, and with our example 
before him, he did something towards establishing 
what was supposed to be a reformed system and a 
regular army, and certainly held his own a great 
deal longer than might have been expected; but 
the proof of the utter rottenness of the reformed 
system is evident in the result of his collision with 
us. His power fell to pieces at the very first 
touch. He did not fight at  all. His government 
was, as it proved, hopelessly feeble and rotten. 
14 
The truth is, that in Afghanistan the only chance 
of exercising a considerable authority is when 
power falls into the hands of a very strong and 
wise man with money at his command. Without 
plenty of money, not an angel from heaven could 
rule that country. 
THE GEOGRAPHY O F  AFGHANISTAN. 
Let us try to realize something of the geography 
and people of this country which we call Afghan- 
istan. In  doing so we must always remember that 
the Afghanistan of the Ameer is not by any means 
the country of the Afghan people. On the contrary, 
most of the Afghan people are outside the Ameer- 
ship, while the Ameer has ruled over a good 
many countries which are not Afghan in their 
population. 
The geography is so complicated a congeries of 
hills that it is very difficult to describe it. To the 
north is the great Caucasian range. Any one who 
looks at the map of Asia sees that the great 
backbone, represented to the north of India by the 
Himalayas, is continued by the Indian Caucasus or 
Hindoo Coosh to the north of Cabul, and thence 
through the north of Persia and the Kurd country 
into Armenia and the Russian Caucasian province. 
To the north-east of Afghanistan the peaks 
approach very nearly the highest in the world, 
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reaching the altitude of upwards of 28,000 feet; 
and on the borders of that country the great peak 
of Nanga Parbat, or L L  naked mountain"-a pro- 
minent object from the Peshawur Valley-is I 
marked on Colonel Walker's map as 26,629 feet 
high. The passes over the higher ranges are never 
less than 16,000 or 17,000 feet. We have no 
survey of the range to the north of Afghanistan, 
but no doubt it somewhat diminishes in height as 
it proceeds westward. The easiest pass north-west 
of Cabul, leading to Bameean and Turkestan, is 
a little over 12,000 ft. high; and the neigh- 
bouring mountains are about 20,000 ft. West of 
that again we know little of the mountains, but 
they seem to be inaccessible till, as the range 
approaches Persia, it becomes for a space con- 
siderably lower. Connecting with this range, just 
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after it leaves India, is the mountainous country 
of Afghanistan, in which, from north to south, one 
range succeeds another in close proximity. The 
Sufeid Eoh range south of the Cabul River is 
upwards of 15,000 ft. high, while the ranges of the 
Suleimanee farther south, so far as we know them, 
seem to run to 11,000 and 12,000 Et. 
It is the characteristic of many mountain ranges 
, that they are, as it were, tilted up on one side, 
with high elevated plateaus on the other side, often 
containing lakes without an exit. That is notably 
so in regard to the Himalayas-very precipitous 
on the 1ndian side, while Tibet behind is s. rugged 
- 2-w 
and very elevated plateau. ' Farther west the 
steep side of the Caucasus is towards Turkestan 
and the Oxus, and that of the Afghan ranges is 
tomards India, while much of Afghanistan is 
e1evn;ted. Taking the country from the slopes of 
the Caucasus to Beloochistan, it may be said that 
parallel to the Indus there is a breadth of about 
200 miles of mountain country of the steeper and 
more difficult character. The whole of this country 
is one mass of the steepest and most inaccessible 
nlountains, intersected by very deep and low 
gorges, and with very scanty valleys scattered 
among them. It all drains tomards the Indus, 
and the main ranges run east and west. Con- 
sequently the few difficult routes through the 
country also run east and west, while north and 
south there is scarcely any comlnunication, the 
physical difficulties being almost insuperable. It 
may generally be said that the further we go south 
the less insuperable are the difficnlties of this 
country. The most practicable passes are towards 
the south ; and in Beloochistan the country becomes 
a good deal more practicable. I have said that 
this tract, draining towards the Indus, is about 
200 miles in breadth, from east to west. We then 
come to the watershed, and west of the watershed 
is a high country which cannot well be called a 
plateau, for it is interrupted by ridges and much 
accented, bat still in a rough way it may almost 
be described, for want of a better term, as sort of 
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plateau. The heights of the different places in 
this country, as niarked on the map, will generally 
be found to be within the range of 5 500 ft. to 
7500 ft. in altitude. A considerable portion of 
this tract immediately south of Ghuznee drains 
into an inland lake without an exit, called the 
Abistadeh Lake, situated about 6500 ft. above the 
sea. This country is in the direct line between 
+ 
Ghuznee and Quettah. Being at an elevation so 
comparatively uniform, there are no such great 
mountains and great depressions as in the country 
farther east, and, difficult though it be, there are 
some sort of commu~lications through this tract; 
so that from Quettah or Pisheen you may go to 
Ghuznee without anywhere ascending or descending 
on a very great scale; and the main road from 
Cabul to Ghuznee and Candahar runs over this 
f 
elevated tract. Cabul is at a height of 6400 ft., 
Ghuznee about 7500 ft., and Khelat-i-Ghilzye 
again about 5800 ft. West of Ghuznee the country 
drains south-west into the Helmuiid and Turnuk 
Rivers, and so into the inland sea or Lake of Zurrah, 
in Seistan. Towards Candahar and Seistan this 
country descends considerably, Candahar being 
about 3000 ft. above the sea, whi1.e the Zurrah 
Lake is apparently only about 1200 ft. Between 
the hills which drain to the south and the main 
range of the Caucasus is the valley of the. Harirood, 
in the western part of which Herat is situated. 
This river runs a long way from east to west, near 
2 
and pafallel to the main range of the Caucasus, 
- much as the CabuZ River on the other side runs 
from west to east. Further on the Harirood runs 
into the north-east corner of Persia, and thence 
loses itself in the deserts of Turkesta~~, passing 
through in fact the only gap in the Caucasian 
range-about the point mhere the Turcomans have 
been in the habit of entering and harrying Persia. 
I 
It must be remembered, however, that a consider- 
able range of hills intervenes between Herat and 
the valley of the Helrnund, on the way to Candahar, 
while the direct route from Herat to Ghuznee and 
Cabul passes over almost impracticable mountains ; 
so that there is not really a complete gap in the 
mountain barrier. It must also be borne in mind 
that there is not, as some people seem to suppose, 
a clear road between Herat and Merv. On the 
contrary, there is a high portion of the Caucasus 
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between the Herat Valley and Turkestan. 
Col. Abbott, ~ h o  travelled from Herat to Merv, 
prudently declines, for strategical reasons, to give 
details of the mountain route; but as he congratu- 
lates himself much on safely getting over the pass 
"where many have perished in the snow," it is 
evident that this crossing is high and difficult. 
On the north face of these mountains the Murghab 
River has its sources, and that river loses itself in 
the desert. of Turkestan, about the place which we 
mark in our maps as Merv. In former days, when 
all these countries were much more moist and 
fertile than 
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1 difficult. 
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loses itself in 
lace which we 
.er days, when 
re moist and 
fertile than they are now, and the water was 
better preserved and utilized, the damming of the 
Murghab supplied ancient Merv and probably gave 
the means of a considerable cultivation. Now all 
these countries have been much desiccated, and the 
irrigation works have gone very much to ruin. 
There is a, half-ruined Turcoman village somewhere 
not far from the site of ancient Merv, to which we 
give that famous name. 
Streams from the northern face of the Indian 
Caucasus also supply the means of irrigation to  
Balkh, Khulm, and the other cultivated tracts 
of Afghan Turkestan - that is, the country 
between the mountains and the Upper Oxus; 
but these streams are all absorbed by irriga- 
tion before they reach the Oxus. The banks 
of the Oxus itself, in that part of its course, are 
for the most part desert and little inhabited. It is 
for that reason that the Oxus as the boundary 
between Afghanistan and Turkestan (so settled 
between ourselves and the Russians) is a very 
suitable boundary-far more suitable than are 
most river boundaries. 
Badskshan and Wakhan farther east are hilly 
countries of the high Oxus, lying on the slopes of 
the Caucasus running dovn towards that river. 
THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN. 
Strange as it may seem, after all our experience 
of Afghanistan, by far the best account of the 
2 *  
20 
country and the people as a whole, in fact I rnay 
say the only systenlatic account of Afghanistan in 
one view, is I - .  1Iountstuart Elphinstone's 
" Kingdom of Cabul," the result of his visit to the 
Afghan borders in the year 1808. There mas then 
still a kingdom of Cabul in the sense which I have 
mentioned, that is a potentate with more or less 
authority in the valleys and accessible parts of the 
country, who claimed a feudal superiority over the 
tribes, and who, in addition to all the territories 
which we now reckon in Afghanistan, still possessed 
part of the western and all the southern portions 
of the Punjaub, Moultan, Cashmere, Sinde, and in 
some sort Beloochistan ; but he was little able to 
hold his own, and his dynasty was tottering to its 
Mr. Elphinstone fully describes the extremely 
limited character of the kingly authority in 
Afghanistan proper, and the . very democratic 
system of the Afghan people ; see particularly 
chapter 2 of his second book, on the divisions 
and government of tlie Afghan nation," and in the 
second volume more detailed accounts of the 
political system and practices of the Eusofzais, 
Duranees, Ghilzyes, and other leading tribes. He 
explains that in some of the tribes in more imme- 
diate connection with the king, the king had to 
some degree the privilege of selecting the principal 
chief from among the members of the oldest 
family, while in other septs or oolooses the chief 
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was elected directly by the people. The heads of 
the inferior divisions, the clans and subdivisions of 
clans, mere, he tells us, always elected. I n  any 
case' the government was of the most democratic 
character. The government of the ooloos and of 
the clan was carried on by assemblies of chiefs 
and headmen called Jeerghas - a popular repre- 
sentative body which our frontier officers very well 
know ; but it seems after all that the members of 
the Jeergha are hardly representatives, but rather 
delegates; for according to Elphilistone it is only 
in matters of small importance that the Jeergha 
can act without consulting their constituents. I n  
matters of more importance he says the sentiments 
of the whole tribe are ascertained before anything 
is decided. He adds that throughout . dl the 
tribes the clannish attachment of the Afghans, 
unlike that of the Scotch Highlanders, is rather to 
the community than to the chiefs, and though in 
their notion of their khan the idea of a magistrate 
set up for the public good is certainly mixed with 
that of a patriarchal and natural superior, yet the 
former impression will always be found to be the 
strongest." 
The Jeerghas are not only political but also 
judicial in their functions. Criminal and other 
trials are, as Elphinstone fully explains, conducted 
by judicial J eerghas. 
Elphinstone also explains the distinction, which 
he diaws somewhat broadly, between the Eastcrll 
and Western Afghans. The Eastern Afghans are 
those who inhabit the rugged country draining 
towards the Indus, which I have described. Most 
of them are agricultural rather than pastoral ; 80 
far as the limited soil at their 'disposal permits, 
they raise crops and fruit. A great part of their 
subsistence is derived from the fruit of the mul- 
berry-tree, dried and pounded. Their means of 
subsistence are so scant that they must live much 
on their neighbows, either honestly by service or 
dishonestly by plunder. They are, even among 
Afghans, more especially democratic and indepen- 
dent and very combative, constantly carrying on 
little wars amongst themselves. The Western 
Afghans, on the other hand, who OCCUPY the 
elevated country to the west and the slopes down 
towards Seistan, are more pastoral in their habits, 
and having given reigning families to  the country, 
have become more accustomed to some sort of 
kingly rule in the sense of owning fealty to a 
feudal king. These RTestern Afghans are mostly 
comprehended in the two large septs of the 
Ghilzyes who occupy the country near Ghuznee 
and Cabul, and the Duranees, formerly called the 
Abdallees, who have the country about Candahar 
and from thence westmard. 
All modern accounts make it clear that the 
Afghans are still just the same people as they were 
in Elphinstone's time, except that, having got rid 
of the semblance of a king of the whole county, 
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-ed country draining 
aye described. Most 
ier than pastoral ; so 
eir -disposal permits, 
A great part of their 
the fruit of the mul- 
:d. Their means of 
,hey must live much 
mestly by service or 
ley are, even among 
ocratic and indepen- 
nstantly carrying on 
lves. The Western 
d, who occupy the 
and the slopes down 
storal in their habits, 
nilies to the country, 
sd to some sort of 
owning fealty to a 
Afghans are mostly 
large septs of the 
~ n t r y  near Ghuznee 
, formerly called the 
try about Canclahar 
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they are even more independent and uncontrollable 
in their ways than they then were. The Eastern 
Afghans have, as I have stated, ceased to have any 
connection with the ruler of Cabul, and they either 
govern themselves or are not governed at all. 
Considering the many wines of population and 
conquest which have passed over the country, it is 
not surprising that there are few parts of 
Afghanistan in which the population is not more or 
less mixed ; but it may be said that the Afghans 
proper, or Pashtoo-speaking people, form the main 
population of the country, from the valley of the 
Cabul River on the north to abo~xt latitude 30" in 
the south, and from the plains of the Indus on the 
east to near Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar 
on the west. I n  fact, a great deal of the central 
portion of t.his country has been held by the tribes 
in so independent a fashion, that i t  has never been 
explored. We know nothing of the country of 
the Wazeerees and some other tribes. 
I n  the Duranee country, from Candahar west- 
ward, the population is more mixed, the dominant 
Duranees being a pastoral population, while the 
arable lands are a good deal cultivated by other 
races, as is indeed the case throughout a great part 
of the whole country west of the watershed. 
I t  is impossible to estimate the numbers of the 
Afghans proper. We know nothing of s great 
portion of them. They are generally taken to be 
from a million and a half to two or three millions, 
of whom one portion are British subjects in the 
submontane tracts ; another and very large 
portion are independent; and another portion have 
generally been more or less subject to Cabul, 
-rather less than more. 
' The Afghans are physically a very fine people. 
There is probably no finer race in the world, and 
thslt they should be so, in spite of poverty, poor 
food, and the absence of washing, is a curious 
physiological fact. The climate no doubt is a yery 
h e  one, tending to robustness. 
They have the chstrncter of being avaricious, 
mercenary, treacherous, and predatory. Avarice 
is the result of poverty combined with energy and 
ambition. Situated as they are, and long accus- 
tomed to serve as mercenary soldiers, it is not 
unnatural they should be mercenwy; and so they 
are in an extreme degree. They can generally be 
bought over to anything except t,he surrender of 
the independence of their own hills; and one 
great cause of their weakness as a people is that 
every Afghan assumes as it matter of course that 
every other Afghan is open to an offer, so that no 
man trusts any other man. Treacherous, too, 
they are, for they have so- long held the passes 
leading from inner Asia t o  India, and have been so 
accustomed to be bought by the many rival powers 
passing that may (who find it cheaper to buy them 
than to fight them), that it is scslrcely surprising 
that one bargain is a<pt to be superseded by a 
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necessity-plunder they mill alwaj-s get when 
they can. On the other hand, they llnve rnl~cEr 
pluck, industry, and enterprise. T:nder fa~-o~lr- 
able circumstances they make excellent soldiers; 
they make the most of their poor hill-glens, and 
carefully tend the orchards vhich supply a great 
trade in preserved fruits; and as pushing and 
hardy small traders, who find their vay iuto the 
farthest part of India, they are unrit-alled. 
They are almost all of the Soonnie or orthodox 
sect of Mahoi~imedans ; but their religion sits verr 
lightly on them. They are more governed by 
their own customary laws than by ' the 91ahom- 
medan Code, and seem just as ready to sell tlneir 
swords to an unbeliever as to any one else, even 
though i t  is to fight against believers. I t  is 
generally said that if an Afghan is ernployecl to 
cut a throat, he will do so with the lllost entire 
absence of religious prejudice. They have, how- 
ever, their own religious ideas, and seem to be 
very fond of holy shrines. The story is either 
true or well found which represents the people of 
an Afghan village, jealous of their neigl~bouru 
who possessed such shrines, as hal-ing caught R 
holy man, killed him, and set up his shrine and 
worship in their village. T'ie are far too much 
given to attribute religious fanaticism to all 
Mallolxmedans ; indeed, in all countries such 
fhnaticisnl is most frecluently developed wl1~1-1 it 
also serves as a political bond ; and among the 
Afghans especially, fanaticism is much more poli- 
tical than religions. Like many other matters, 
this is, however, very much a question of race, 
and there seems to be a good deal more of real 
religious feeling among the Eusofzyes and other 
north-eastern Afghans, whose blood has been a 
good deal mixed with the aborigines of their 
valleys, by descent Indians,-a more imaginative 
race. I think that almost all the assassinations on 
the frontier that have seemed to partake of a 
character of religious fanaticism have been perpe- 
trated by people of these north-eastern tribes. 
After the Afghans the most important people 
of Afghanistan are the Persian-speaking popula- 
tions, who are probably almost as numerous in 
Afghanistan as a whole as the Afghans them- 
selves, and are certainly much more numerous in 
the territories which were ruled over by the 
Ameer. I have used the term " Persian-speaking" 
because we must not confound these people with 
the modern Persians, of whom there are only a 
fea  in the towns and some outlying portions of 
t'he country. We may, however, fairly apply the 
term " Persian," in a large sense, to the great old 
Persian race as distinct from the Persians of 
modern Persia. These old Persians were a very 
great people, and occupied, besides modern Persia, 
Bactria and the neighbouring countries; in fact, 
not only most of what we now call Afghanistan, 
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but almost the whole of Turkestan. They haye 
been conquered by Turks and &fo~~gols, but their 
descendants still remain in all these countries, 
forming a large part of the cultivating and traclirlg 
population, and everywhere retaining dialects of 
their own Persian language. The Persian is a 
charlning language-charming in its simplicity as 
well as in other qualities : it may be called the 
English of the East; and none who have once had 
the advantage of using it seem ever to abandon it. 
Modern Persia is a part of old Persia which, like 
the rest, mas conquered and overrun by Turkish 
tribes, who still form the dominant race in Persia. 
But t h e  Persian language prevailed there-the 
people of Persia now speak Persian, except in 
parts of Western Persia, where the imnligrsllt 
tribes retain their Turkish tongue. The nationality 
of modern Persia is in a great degree due to the 
adoption by these Persians of the Sheeah form of 
Mahommedanism, by which they are separated in1 
bitter feud from all their neighbours. The Turkish 
conquerors, like the Normans in England, have 
become amalgamated with the Persians, and so has . 
been formed the modern Persian people. 
Outside of the limits of this modern Persia 
the old Persians retain their self-government irr 
some degree only where they have had the protcc- 
tion of inaccessible hills. I t  may be said tb t  
they still occupy the whole range of the Caucasus, 
from the  borders of Turlcey to the borders of India. 
I cio not know if the Arlnenians are allied to the 
Persians, or whether among the variety of race 
~bnd language which prevail in the Russian Cau- 
casus any peop1es.of Persian origin are to be found; 
but the languages of the Kurds show them to be a 
Persian mce, and in the hill country in the north 
of Persia we ha\-e the most Persian of modern 
Persians. Further east, the Eimaks and Haxa- 
rehs, tribes occupying a port'ion of the Caucasian 
rallge up to the vicinity of Ghuznee and Cabul, 
are Persian-spealring, but not pure Persians, as 
their features evidently show. They have stroiig 
3longolian traits. This is said to be the result of 
an immigration of Tartars which took place in the 
time of Chengis Khan. They must have amalga- 
niated with the aboriginal Persians, and the 
language of the latter prevailed. I have not 
learned much of the Eimaks, but t.11ey seem to be 
allied to the Hazarehs, and the Hazarehs are well 
known, not only because they were frequent at 
Caltul during our occupation there, but because 
they come down in search of work to the Yunjaub 
territories, where they niake capital labourers. A 
Hazareh navvy is said to be better than any native 
of India. In  the character of labourers, at any 
rate, they are a useful and pleasant people. 
The Icohistanees, or Highlanders of the hill .  
country north of Cabul, are old Persians without 
the intermixture of blood ~vhicli makes the 
H:~zaiehs a scpasate people ; and again further 
~llied to the 
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the whole of the northern face of the Indian 
Caucasus till we reach Tibet, are inhabited by 
this old Persian race. Affinities of language seem 
to show that the interesting race of I<affirs, or un- 
believers, of the high ranges-that is, the aboriginal 
race never converted to &Iahonzmedanism - 
, are also of this ancient Persian stock. All these 
hill tribes retain the robustness of the oiiginal 
race. In  a tamer condition the salne race forms 
the mass of the cultivators of the valley of the 
Harirood and the neighbourhood of Herat, and 
also of the more southern province of Seistan. 
They form a large proportion of the agricul- 
tural population of the valleys about Cabul alld 
Ghuznee ; in fact, of the whole of Afghanistan 
except the portion bordering upon India. They i 
also occur about Balkh and the other cultivate8 
portions of Afghan Turkestan as well as farther 
north. They are always quiet and good cultivators. 
In Afghanistan and some parts of Turkestan, 
they are generally called L L  Tajilcs," while in the 
further parts of Q~rkestan the same people are 
known as " Sarts " and are frequently described 
under that name. They are also known under the 
general name of Parseewans or Persians. They 
are all Soonnie Mahornrnedans (in that respect 
entirely differing from their cogeners the Sheeahs 
of Persia) excepting only the Kaffirs, and also I 
may add, the Parsees of Western India. This 
latter race seems to have emigrated into India 
rather than accept M ahommedanism. A little 
difference in spelling often prevents us from 
recognizing a word, but the words Parsee and 
Parsee-wan are really identical with our Persi and 
Persi-an. Just  so we find it difficult to recognize 
the same word in the Turkish Spahi, the French 
Cypay8, and the English Sepoy, properly Sipahi. 
The people of Indian race found in the northern 
and western borders of Afghanistan are now con- 
verted to Mahommedanism, but throughout the 
coulitry Hindoo bankers and traders, still retaining 
their own religion, are everywhere more or less 
found. 
I n  Afghan Turkestan, besides the Persian popu- 
lation which I have already mentioned, there is a 
considerable population of Uzbegs, the race of 
Turkish conquerors from whom the country came 
to be called Tmkestan; but these Uzbegs seem 
now to be settled down as a tolerably peaceful 
people. 
I need hardly mention the Belooches as part of 
the population of Afghanista~; as Beloochistan 
has for many years been quite independent of 
the Afghans ; but some of our maps, include, 
I think, in the extreme south a little of the 
country bordering on the Lower Punjaub, which is 
really held by Belooch tribes. I may say of the 
Belooches generally, that it is well known to our 
political officers that they are in their character 
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materially different from the Afghans, being much 
less rabidly independent, if I may so express it, 
and more amenable to be dealt with through their 
chiefs. 
THE DENAKD FOR RESIDENTS. 
Such being the country and people of Afghanistan, 
let us look to our recent action. As is well known 
the present co111plications originally arose out of 
our demand to station British Residents in 
Afghanistan. We must quite realize what this 
means. We must always remember that nearly 
connected as Afghanistan is with India, the people 
there must necessarily view these things from an . 
Indian point of view. It is difficult to persuade 
them that a Resident does not mean something of 
the same character as that to which the term is 
applied in India. Now, the British Resident in 
India is a very well-known character. He is by 
no means merely the minister or ambassador of a 
friendly power. He is much more than that. It 
is his duty to overlook and criticize the native 
state to which he is accredited. This near 
supervision and criticism is just what all native 
governments exceedingly dislike. They are willing 
enough to submit to our military superiority 
and political control, but it is the constant over- 
looking their doinestic affairs that they hate; and 
all of thein who can by any manner of means 
escape from this supervision, spare no effort to do 
so. Not only is this the case in regard to the 
smaller states who have not hitherto been honoured 
wit11 Residents, but 1 may instance the case of the 
large state of Cashmere. That is a state of our 
creation. It is by its original construction 
feudatory and tributary to ourselves. I t  has 
never been at all refractory or troublesome, but on 
the contrary has been what I may c d l  a very 
amenable state. Yet the constant struggle of the 
ISIaharajah's life is to escape the infliction of a 
permanent Resident, in which object he has 
hitherto, I believe, succeeded, though he submits 
to a temporary Resident sent up for six months 
each year. For my part I think it a mistake too 
much to force Residents on native states. I have 
always found that if they are to  be maintained at 
all, they get on best when they are left alone with 
s certain fear before their eyes of that sacred right 
of rebellion of which the people are deprived when 
we take the matter in hand. In my opinion, by far 
the best managed states in India and those most 
accepted by the people, are the smaller ones which 
have no Residents. I believe the R~rssians are 
much wiser than we in the management of the 
states in Asia which they have reduced to a pro- 
tected condition : they have a very effective 
military control oover them, hut do not worry them 
with Residents. 
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The  only case of an Indian Resident which 
might seem to supply some precedent for 
Afghanistan is in Nepaul. We have a Resident in 
Nepaul who is not a master but a British Minister 
only. We have made in some respects satisfactory 
arrangements with the Nepaul govern- 
ment, namely, that while that state retains its 
domestic independence, it is bound to take 
no Europeans into its service without our per- 
mission, to consult us in regard to any disputes 
wi th  its neighbours, and especially to submit ta 
our arbitration any disputes with one neighbour, 
namely, Sikhim. In Nepaul there is a compara- 
tively settled government over a quiet people, and 
there are no dangerous neighbours. Yet in truth 
in one respect our relations with Nepaul are some- 
wha t  humiliating. The members of our Residency 
are strictly confined to the neighbourhood of the 
Residency. The Nepnulese prohibit in the strictedt 
manner any of our officers or any Europeans 
whatever from travelling about, or, as they would 
put it, spying in any part of their country, except 
only the one direct road from the plains to the 
capital. So strictly do they adhere to this rule, 
that when I was last in India the officer com- 
manding .the divisiorn in which Da~jeeling is situated, 
happening when on a visit to that place to have 
gone a little tour in the hills, either from careless- 
ness or accident, overstepped the Nepaul boundary, 
and  being in Nepaul territory was apprehended by 
3 
113g4 ?;$'I\~~l police and put in gual-d fa* the night. 
'rhc nest morning he was taken before the . - 
~t~~~~~~~ nlngistrate, when he was graciously 
h~k~r;ti4f Fvith s ~~*arning. The NepauIese were 
rrzing H, rtricilv within rule, that we could make no 
rrrlrnnatinn. i think we should hardly desire to 
~.cullF in Afghanistan a position so Ilumiliatillg as 
b t  w]liVh we thus hold in Nepaul. My opinion is, 
*hJ1 Re dlould do much better not to demand the 
alitni<.iian of 8 permanent Resident at Cab111 or 
hrrabAar, if do not proceed to a military occu- 
14abtn of. tllose places. ' It mould be quite enough 
fiir taikh I~urpOseS that me should have access to the 
~~rrietries af the Ameer when occasion requires, 
finti. ~n~h :&I~ ly?  that me should be permitted to  
+trktit8n n British Agent at Balkh to look after 
fn4ntiifiy msttem and settle any difficulties which 
n q  mire with the Russians. The population 
nl.x,llt l%:hlkh is not Afghan, and there are not the 
ralrrr: ttifiictilties and objections to a resident Agent 
rho: ttrrsrc are among an Afghan population, where, 
t rrrt i f  the Afg2ian government consents, the 
~wiqole are apt to make the position a very 
tlaflgtbw tr s one. 
i f l * ~ t  tlko is not a very Afghan place, and, so far 
the ~ r ~ l ~ ~ l ~ t i o n  is concerned, there would pro- 
1*lbly 1%: IlQ great objection to the residence 
4,f ljriti3lh i\,~ellt ; but I do not see what would 
~ d ~ ~ f ~ ~ g e  of such an Agent, for we have 
~~~~~t~ wcesa to the neighbouring Persian 
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territory, and that is really much more convenient 
for dealing with the Turcoman frontier, to which 
t h e r e  is much easier access from Persia than from 
H e r a t .  Not only is Meshed much nearer to Merv 
t h a n  is Herat, but the Persians hold Surakhs and 
other  places on the immediate border of Turkestan. 
I feel however that in truth this question of the 
Turcoman border requires to be carefully dealt 
with. Merv, as I have explained, is now a mere 
-me; bu t  the village in the vicinity which we are 
$eased to  call Merv is really a specimen of a class 
of places which involve important questions with 
regard  t o  the position of the Turcomans. The 
Russians have it appears brought under control all 
the settled Uzbeg Khanates. There remain only 
the wandering Turcoman tribes of the desert lying 
between Khiva and the hilly boundaries of Persia 
and Afghanistan, who though punished have not 
b e e n  brought under subjection, and who, predatory 
as they are, give a great deal of trouble. We may 
gather,  however, that these people are not alto- 
ge ther  incorrigible when they have the means of 
settling down to an honest livelihood, Considerable 
numbers of them seem to have settled to cultiva- 
t i o n  within the Persian borders, and they have 
considerable cultivated tracts of tlieir o w .  They 
have  it appears a line of agricultural settlements 
stretching along the northern face of the hills from . 
Kezil Arvat, the present limit of the 1Zussin11 
military po~ver, ensh~vfird to Mcrv. All rtlolig 
3 "  
that line of country streams coming down from 
the hills give the means of irrigation and cultiva- 
tion which these Turcomans have utilized, and so 
formed a number of small settlements. The Merv 
district upon the larger stream, the hlurghab, is a 
somewhat larger settlement of the kind. The last 
Englishman whb visited Nerv, Colonel James 
Abbot, describes it as a village of about one 
hundred huts, some twelve miles from the site of 
Old Merv. There is, he says, considerable irriga- 
tion and cultivation, but only the poorer grains are 
produced, and from his account it appears that far 
from its being a granary of Asia, as some people 
have supposed, grain is really brought across the 
desert from K h i ~ a  to Merv and thence into the 
barren hills lying between Merv and Herat. The 
Turcomans of the desert have their places of refuge 
and recruitment in the various oases which I have 
described along the foot of the hills-thither it is 
that the Russians may find it necessary to chase 
them. They have chased them, and are apparently 
about to chase them again into the smaller oases 
to the west, and some day they may have ground 
for chasing them into Merv. That is really the 
whole question of Merv, about which so much has 
been said. No doubt me cannot expect that the 
Russians should submit to allow these people to 
a retain asylruns from which they themselves are 
debarred. While the Turcornans still issue for 
~urposes of plunder it seems quite necessary that 
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nans still i s s u e  for 
quite necessary that 
some settlement should be made, and that betmeen 
the  Russians, the Persians, the Afghans, and our- 
selves an arrangement for, if I may so express it, 
policing the Turcomans, and if possible settling 
them down, should be come to. 
I n  another quarter, north of the Caucasus, there 
is also the prospect of diEculty. 'The last news is 
that  the Badukshanees have wholly revolted from 
the suzerainty of the Afghans; which is just what 
might have been expected, for the Afghan dominion 
over them is very recent, and never mas very 
complete. Over Wakhan, I believe, the Afghan 
dominion mas purely nominal. In the arrangement 
that mas made with Russia by which Badukshan 
and Wakhan were reserved to Afghanistan, we 
counted without the Badukshanees and TVakhanees* 
If we should try to force them back to Afghan 
rule it may be that we shall drive them into the 
arms of Russia. As thhgs now stand, if they 
have really thrown off the Afghans, it may be 
necessary that we should establish direct communi- 
cations with them through British Agents. If we 
acknowledge their independence, this may not 
b e  difficult, for these Persian races are much lnore 
if 
tractable than Afghans. 
As regards the question of a permanent Resident 
at Cabul, we must always bear in mind that the 
Ameer, even with the best intentions, really would 
have very great difficulty in securing the safety of 
the  mission, while the internal discords among the 
themselves must render the position of 
&&dent most difficult. In case of commotion 
:ara<f rerolution he mould find it very difficult 
ilidcerl ro regulate his conduct without giving 
~rle,rtnI oEence to one party or other. Suppose the 
rnsintions of fortune which occurred after the 
cjentfl of Dost Mahommed to follow the death of 
$ ] f i d r c j  -4li also (and in truth me should expect theIlll 
I * )  be much more aggravated) how impossible it 
w5.u2tl be for a British Resident a t  the capital to 
1.1 bin1 ,a &fife and impartial position without the 
~ i g g ~ !  '0a.t of a military force. Let us not put our- 
&& 1% c* in 30 unpleasant a position. 
THE SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
Srst Ire come to the scientific frontier, which 
wt* f ire toIiI is not the cause but the consequence of 
t l i ~  war. I must examine that question a little in 
rIvr:ri%. 
I set out my views of a safe and scientific 
frt-jxltier in 1849, when we annexed the Punjaub. 
IVfisr 1 ihen considered to be the scientific frontier 
rn. the upper course of the Indus. General 
Ilroilcy, an authority very much to be respected, 
-:lgficats sereral objections to the Indus as a 
fra.:iticr7 but I find that his statement of the case 
" f t m  entirely to the lower course of the river, 
wilere it flows through broad plaius separated by a 
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~tatement of t h e  case 
' Course of the  river, 
3 plains separated by a 
long distance from the mountaivins, and where the 
Indian populations overpass it and are found equally 
on both sides. I quite admit that the Lower Indus 
is not a suitable frontier-but my Indus frontier is 
the Upper Indus, where it divides the lower hill 
country of the Punjaub and the range known as the 
Salt range from the mountains and valleys of 
Afghanistan. In the latitude of Peshawur and 
Icurram the Indus runs through this hilly country 
with Little or no cultivation on its banks. The 
Afghan districts beyond the Indus which were 
conquered by Runjeet Singh, and to  which me 
succeeded, namely, Peshamur, Kohat, and Bunnoo, 
are valleys surronnded by the Afghan hills, and 
their cultivation depends on the irrigation which 
they draw &om the hill streams. The population 
of these districts is really almost wholly Afghan. 
The Ind~xs, in fact, in this part of its course is n 
true ethnological boundary, the population on one 
side being Indian, and on the other side Afghan. 
Runjeet Singh had in fact held these districts but 
a, short time, and the Sikhs had never thoroughly 
brought them under control. The civil govern- 
ment was carried on through Afghan Sirdars, and 
the military government was in the hands of the 
Italian General Avitabile, who held his own by 
dint of copious hanging. My proposal in 1849 
was to give back these extra-Indian districts to the 
Afghans, establishing our own scientific military 
frontier upon the Upper Indus. The Indus is 
there a rapid and difficult stream, forming ~m 
admirable military boundary. Confined within 
high banks, it is not so broad or devious as to 
prevent our bridging it by the aid of modern 
science. We might have had bridges commanded 
by our forts. I went, however, a little farther, and 
proposed a plan by which the Afghan districts 
which had been conquered by Runjeet were to be 
given back, not unconditionally, but as fiefs of the 
British crown, for which homage was to be done, 
and in consideration of which the Afghans were t o  
be bound to our alliance, and were to be debarred 
from political relations with foreign powers. My idea 
was that by a gift on these terms, besides getting 
rid of an expensive encumbrance, me should not 
only have given an zlccession to  the means of the 
ruler of Cabul which might the better enable him 
to maintain some sort of regular government in 
Afghanistan, and bind him to us by the obliga- 
tion of this gift, but also we should have some- 
thing upon which we could come d o ~ n  in case 
of any misconduct without the disagreeable neces- 
sity of a campaign in the Afghan hills. I also 
suggested that we should reserve the privilege of 
marching through these Afghan fiefs in order to 
block the passes whenever such a step might be 
considered necessary; and I threw out for con- 
sideration that possibly we might establish an 
easily-garrisoned hill fort at the mouth of the 
l i l ~ y h r  -a sort of '' Porter's Lodge," as I 
described 
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described it-where would be kept the key of the 
gate, and admittance given or refused as we should 
desire. I must admit, too, that at this time I 
proposed as part of the arrangement that the 
Ameer should receive a Resident British Minister 
at Cabul., It is possible that if things had been so 
arranged at that time, and a very substantial 
benefit conferred in return for what we asked. 
thillf;~ might have settled down on that basis, and 
the arrangements might now have become per- 
manent and satisfactory to both parties. ~~t 
perhaps I should say that I am wiser now, and see 
the difficulties and disadvantages of the British 
Nesident more clearly than I did then. 
Lord Dalhousie,-that great man, who mas then 
Governor - General,-himself told me that he 
approved in principIe of my suggestions, and would 
llave preferred the Indus boundary to that which 
was adopted, if other considerations had not inter- 
fered; but he said that the Afghans had come 
down and given some assistance to the Sikhs 
during the war, and that this precluded him from 
luaking such a. concession as I suggested. I have 
d\v;~ys had the greateat respect for and admiration 
of Lord Dalhousie, and I have been bis follower in 
things ; but I must say I think that in 
illis matter he too much sacrificed permanent to 
I'ss&ng considerations. After thinking over the 
~ l l i t e r  for thirty years more, I am, I confess, of 
tllo aalnc opinion still, and believe that the Indus 
would have been the best boundary. I not only 
admired Lord Dalhousie's great genius, but thought 
him entirely right in the annexations which he 
made within India, the Punjaub, the Nagpore 
country, and the rest-(oude be it remembered 
he did not annex : he declined that because he 
thought we could not justly do it). If, however, 
that great man had a weakness, it was perhaps in a 
disposition to carry annexation too far, and I 
ventured to think him wrong when he overstepped 
the natural and ethnographical boundaries of India 
in going beyond the Indus on one side and into 
Burmah on the other. It is somewhat curious that 
now, thirty pears later, both those extra-Indian 
annexations have brought us into trouble. I t  may 
be that if we had never crossed the Indus in 1849 
we should not now be involved in a new Afghan 
war; and whatever the immediate advantages of 
the Burmese annexation, if me had not gone 
beyond India to the Irawady, we should not now 
be troubled with the question which looms before 
us in Burmah. 
However, as a matter of fact, in 1849 we carried 
our frontier up to the foot of the Afghan hills, and 
for the last thirty years we have encountered there 
the difficulties which I and other3 anticipated. 
With our strong and equal hand we have no doubt 
managed directly to administer the annexed 
districts as Runjeet Singh never did, but we have 
have had great trouble with them. For instance, 
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I am told that the Punjaub criminal returns 
show more murders than the rest of India, and 
the one district of Peshawur more murders than 
all the rest of the Punjaub. The difficulty of 
bringing the perpetrators to justice is extreme, for 
I am told that in point of audacious, unblushing, 
and well-supported perjury a Bengalee is a mere 
child to an Afghan. These difficulties, however, 
are trifling coinpared to those caused by the raids 
of the hill tribes upon our borders. These raids 
always have been from the beginning of time, and 
I am afraid always will be. We have had the 
most extreme difficulty in devising sufficient means 
of dealing with the tribes upon our borders. We. 
have tried blocking them out from all traffic with 
OUT territory, but that has been only partially 
successful, and every now and again we are 
obliged to undertake expeditions into the outer 
hills. From the time of Sir Charles Napier and 
Sir Colin Campbell down to the present, these 
expeditions have always been of the same cha- 
racter, with the same results, or rather no results. 
We always, with much fuss, arrange expeditions, 
each of which is is to be the really effective and 
exemplary one, which is to settle the question 
finally. We always go up into the bills and 
generally ellcounter but little resistance in going. 
When we get into the petty settlements within our 
reach the hill people disappear with their flocks 
and hcrcls and goods, and leave 116 their miserable 
huts, upon which we wreak our vengeance, as we 
do upon any petty crops they may have left, if it 
is the crop season. -When that is done, nothing 
remains but to go back again. As soon as we 
turn, the hill tribes are down upon our rear; and 
thus having marched up the hill, we march down 
again in a somewhat humiliating way, howled at and 
fired upon by the Afghans as we go; so with more 
or less loss we get home again and write a 
despatch, describing the whole affair as a most 
successful expedition, crowned by a glorious 
x~ictory. That has been many times repeated. I t  
must be admitted that this state of things is not 
very satisfactory, and in spite of our so-called 
~~ictories the evil has not been cured. But upon 
the whole the raids and the expeditions are of late 
years somewhat less numerous than they were 
before. Some of the hill people we have induced 
to settle in the lover districts, upon land we have 
given them. And a t  any rate we know the worst 
-me have become accustomed to  the situation. 
There is R, limit to the exposed border; and after 
all it may be said, that these troublesome tribes are 
rather thoims in our side than a serious political 
danger. One thing is quite certain, 'that for 
offensive action against us, the Afghan tribes are 
wholly contemptible. NO two tribes ever seem to 
be capable of uniting against us for offence, and if 
ever they did unite, they would still be entirely 
contemptible enemies down in the plains. There 
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That was the position till the other day. Now 
let us see the new position that has been taken up. 
On the  first day of the present session of Parlia- 
ment, Lord Beaconsfield in the Lords and Sir 
Stafford Northcote in  the Commons made a s b u l -  
tane0u.s and almost identical announcement, to the 
effect that the objects of the present war had been 
already accomplished by the occupation of the 
points which our troops had reached, and Lord 
Beaconsfield went on to say that this accomplish- 
ment of the object of the war consisted in the 
occupation of the three main routes between India 
and Afghanistan, which he said he hoped we 
should permanently retain. I n  saying this he 
referred to  the occupation of what are known as 
the Khyber, Kurram, and Bolan routes. Now as a 
matter of fact, the Iiurram is certainly not one of 
the three main routes between India and Afghan- 
istan, for the plain reason that by this route Cabul 
and the upper country are only reached over a 
succession of difficult passes, the highest of which 
is 12,000 feet high,-say twice the height of the 
Simplon. It is quite clear that such a mountain 
pass is not one which can ever admit of an easy 
and abundant traffic, or of the passage of troops 
encumbered with baggage and wheeled carriages. 
This route has never been and cannot be used to 
any considerable extent for mercantile pLlrposes 
It is in no sense one of the main routes. There 
really three main routes, but the principal 
route lying intermediate between the Khyber and 
the Bolan is not the Eurram, but a route much 
further south known as the Gomul or Goleree. We 
have very little knowledge of this route, and have 
never surveyed it, but it must be a co l~para t iv~ l~  
easy way to the high tract between Ghuznee and 
Quettah, for it seems that it is really more used by 
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no breadth. The result evidently is and must be really were 
a greet multiplication of our old difficulties; for stratetegical a 
rvllcrens we have hitherto had comparatively short 
liues of frontier along the foot of the hills, we 
ha>-e now, by running veiy far up into the hills at 
several points, made that frontier several times 
longer than it was before. The result has been, 
a11d must continue to be, that we have had many 
more edlisions with many more tribes than ever 
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The accounta which we almost daily receive suffi- 
ciently evidence that this is the state of things. 
Every two or three days the telegraph brings us 
an account of a fight with this tribe or with that. 
The general result seems to be that 200 or 300 
of the natives are killed to two or three on our 
side. Sometimes our loss is more considerable. 
Correspondents have been brought under military 
control, and me are not permitted to know the 
truth of these things; but from such accounts as 
we have I am rather inclined to fear that some of 
the actions in which the losses on the two sides are 
so utterly disproportionate, are little more than 
attacks by our troops on villagers who have not at 
once made submission. Other affairs have been 
1 .  
more serious. For instance, I believe there is no ' 
doubt that the expeditions we undertook against 
the AEreedees of the Khyber, whom we attempted 
t o  punish in the Bazaar and Teerah hill valleys, 
really were a failure, ending in our retreat for 
strategical and political reasons. It is well under- 
stood, too, that a good deal of such success as me 
have had with the tribes has been achieved as 
much by bribing as by fighting. The many small 
fights which are grandiloquently described in the 
telegrams may be exhilarating to our troops, but 
they are by no means so to the Afghans. On the 
contrary, they must inevitably lead to a, very great 
bitterness and deep hatred. 
me most notable instance of the irnpolic~ of 
this petty style of warfare is General Roberts's 
expedition into the Khost Valley: In former 
days, in connection with operations on the other 
extremity of India, I have had the pleasure of 
bowing and appreciating General Roberts's 
qualities. He was then. in a subordinate 
psition, and no one man could have been better ; 
but I must say it now seems that, having risen 
somewhat suddenly to high military and political 
command, he appears to have been left too un- 
bridled, and not only to h a ~ e  carried his military 
action improvidently far, but to have dabbled too 
much in politics to which he was not bred. The 
Valley of IChost is far away in the hills, altogether 
apart from our former frontier, and also quite off 
the line of the ICurram route to Cabul. *''The 
inhabitants of that valley had given us no cause 
of offence whateve; when General Roberts -under- 
took their subjugation. The descriptions of the 
correspondent of the StancZa~d probably were 
highly coloured, but in the main I cannot see that 
they have been at all contradicted. General 
Roberts's telegrams did in fact confirm the main 
portion of the correspondent's statements. There 
seems no doubt whatever that General Roberts 
did carry fire and sword into that comparatively 
peaceful and happy valley-if such a term can be 
applied to any Afghan  alley ; that ehe did burn, 
destroy, and plunder a number of villages and 
killed many of the- i l  
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tance of the impolicF of killed many of the inhabitants. I had assumed 
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number of villages and General Roberts in going iiit,o Khost had attempted 
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was beyond his means, and he was obliged to 
retreat in a somewhat ignominious wagr. ' The 
result certainly must be to leave memories of 
bitter. hatred among the people of Khost without 
our having accomplished any object whatever! 
Not only did we thus come into collision with 
tribes in the very heart of Afghanistan with whom 
we had no previous quarrel, but the result was to 
stir up all the hornets about, and as an immediate t 
consequence of this expedition the great tribe of the 
Waziris made a serious and successful raid into 
our own territories 011 the other side of the hills. 
The whole Kurram movement was, I thitllc, a 
mistake. We have scattered our forces im- 
prudently. We should have done much better to 
concentrate them on the Khyber and the Bolan, 
both of which are far more practicable routes. 
Of the Iihyber this at least may be said, that it is \ 
the only route practicable for g ~ ~ i l s  and carriages, 
and that it is that which has always been followed. 
It does not involve the surmounting of passes at a 
great elevation, but only the ascent to Cabul 
through passes difficult but not impracticable. Of 
the Bolan I shall speak presently. Here I will 
only add, that about Candahar also it has seemed 
to be a strange policy to allow of advances to I. 
Gharisk and other places, involving disagreeable 
collisions with the people followed by retreat. That 
can only irritate and embolden the tribes. We 
should have been in a better position if we had 
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halted quietly at Caiidahar, unless we had resolved 
to advance to Cabul. I suspect the Afghans may 
with some truth suppose that we have a sort of 
superstitious dread of Cabul. 
Taking a purely military view of the occupation of 
the occupation of the three routes through the hills, 
i t  is not for me to attempt to determine the matter 
by arguments of my own. On this subject I 
appeal to the authGity of General Hamley and 
other sciebtific military authorities, who have, I 
think, very clearly shown the extreme strategical 
objections to the plan of occupying separately all 
three routes, if we are not to do more than. that. 
Besldes the constant exposure to attacks on either 
side of a very long line of occupation on each 
route, what they specially dwell upon as fatal to 
the plan is the entire want of lateral communica- 
tion between the forces occupying the different 
lines. The Bhyber route is separated from the 
Kurram route by the Sufeid ICoh range, the height 
of which is so great and so uniform that there are 
absolutely no passes through or over it whatever. 
I t  appears to maintain throughout its length a 
pretty uniform altitude of about 15,000 ft., SO that  
the force stationed along the Khyber route is 
absolutely cut off from that on the Kurram. The 
Kurram route communicates with Cabul, and the 
upper country only over the Shutergurden pass, 
12,000 ft. high, blocked by snow great part of the 
year, and at its best only practicable for very light 
4 *  
traffic. I t  is literally the fact. tha t  General 
Roberts's force cannot communicate with that of 
Sir Samuel Brown's by any other means than either 
by going back though Kohat and Peshawur and up 
the Xhyber again,, or else over the Shutergurden 
and back to the Khyber through Cabul. On the 
other side me cannot tell the height of the moun- 
tains and the character of the passes between the 
Kurram and the Gornul or Goleree route, simply 
because that is an inaccessible country, to this day 
wholly unexplored, and regarding which we are 
almost entirely without information. It may 
certainly be assumed that it does not admit of easy 
military communications. That being so, it is 
scarcely surprising that no responsible military 
men have been found to advocate this plan of 
occupying the three routes, so far as I have been 
able to learn. The only man of authority who did, 
I believe, some years ago when he was a younger 
man and had not his present experience advocate 
the occupation of the Rurram Valley, was General  
Peter Lumsden, the present Adjutant-General in 
India ; but I atn told that in his late letters he 
expresses an opinion decidedly adverse to  the 
positions which we have take up. Lord Napier of 
Mngdala's opinion seems to be decided on the 
point. He was long in favour of holding on to our 
Indian frontier. Now his -opinion has advanced, 
and he argues that me must place our frontier 
be~ond the tfibes whose hostility gives so much 
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trouble, and says, L L  it is for the interest of the 
empire that when the day for the struggle comes 
we should fight our battles beyond the mountain 
barrier. I think it necessary for the interests of 
our Indian Empire that we should advance beyond 
the mountain barrier and fight the battle of India 
outside and not inside of it." This view, then, is 
that if we advance at all we must take up positions, 
not merely within the mountain passes but beyond 
them. 
I n  addition to the strategical disadvantages of the 
plan for holding these different routes through the 
mountains, another great objection is the unhealthi- 
ness of the hot and barrow valleys. Peshawur has 
always been a. most unhealthy place, which has 
created great havoc among our troops, and already 
me have begun to experience the same difficulty in 
the more advanced posts. This, too, seems to  be a 
strong reason why we should either not advance a t  
all, or advance further into the higher and healthier 
country. 
Certainly this plan for occupying the three routes 
is not dictated by military science. 
1 Well, then, if this new frontier which we have 
now occupied is not scientific from a military point 
of view, is it a scientific frontier from a political 
point of view ? '  On this subject I am able to quote 
a very high authority, no less than the real author 
of the plan of the scientific frontier. Dr. Bellew . 
has accompanied several rnissioils into ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ,  
hag probably soen more of these hills than any 
other man, and so far as his knowledge goes there 
certainly could be no better authority. It is 
generally understood, I may say known, that he is 
the only msu whom Lord Lytton has very fully 
admitted into his confidence in this matter. It 
seems that some years ago ih., Bellew had pub- 
lished his opinions on the subject of the frontier, 
and now, after the advantage he has had of full 
communication with Lord T,ytton, and with a com- 
plete knowledge of what is going on, he has 
republished his views in the form of a little 
pamphlet which has been sent to  me from India. 
 endi in^ that pamphlet I have found to my sur- 
prise that the idea of 'L rectifying" the frontier in 
order to obtain " a scientific frontier" which we had 
attributed to Lord Beaconsfield, is really plagiarized 
from Dr. Bellew, whose letters, published y e w  ago, 
are entirely devoted to urging this plan-the terms 
" scientific frontiep'and '' rectification" being those 
which he continually repeats. Let us see, then, 
what Dr. Bellew's plans are. First, I may quote 
him as showing with much greater authority than 
I can the objections to a mere occupation of the 
routes through the hills according to the present 
plan. He says : - 
'' The Iiurrarn Valley would involve the addition 
of about 150 miles of hill frontage to our border, 
and would bring us into contact with the inde- 
y e~ident Orakzais, Zaimukhts, Toris, Cabul-Iihel, 
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Waziris and others, against whose hostility and 
inroads, here as in other parts of the border, we 
shall have to protect our territory. By its posses- 
sion, as we are now situated, we should be com- 
mitted to the defence of a long narrow strip of 
land, a perfect cul de sac in the hills, hemmed in 
by a number of turbulent robber tribes, who are 
under no control and acknowledge no authority. 
In  ordinary times its acquisition would add to the 
serious difficulties of our position. I n  times of 
trouble or disturbance on the border its possession 
would prove a positive source of weakness, a dead 
weight upon our free action. I n  it we should run 
the risk of being hemmed in by our foes in the 
overhanging hills around, of being cut off from our 
communicrttions with the garrison at Kohat, by the 
Orakzais on the one side, by the Waziris on the 
other. These fire the disadvantages of the step. 
In return what advantages should we derive 3 
Not one. With Kurram in our possession, me 
certainly could not flank either the Khyber or the 
Goleri because between it and the one inter- 
venes the impassable snowy range of Sufed I<oh, 
and between it and the other intervenes the vast 
routeless hilly tract of the TVaziris. From Kurram 
we could neither command Cabul nor Ghazni, 
because the route to either is by a several days' 
march, over stupendous hills and tortuous defiles, 
ill comparison with which the historical Iihyber 
and Bolan passes, or even the less widely known 
Goleri pass aie 8s I<i~~g's highways; These are the 
main objections to the adoption of the scheme with 
our border as it now stands. But let the border 
be rectified, let the frontier line be reconstructed, 
and all these objections and disadvantngea rlis- 
appear." 
, Well, he says that everything is to be put right 
by rectifying the frontier, and he proceeds to tell 
us what that means. He says :- . 
" But mhat does the rectification of the border 
mean? What does the reconstruction of the 
frontier imply ? By reconstruction of the frontier 
is implied the subjection of the border tribes, and 
the embodiment of schemes for their employment. 
We must now no longer pursue the course me 
Save hitherto followed. We mnst norp change 
our policy entirdy ; we must now alter our tactics 
altogether. Instead of, as heretofore, settling our 
border quarrels by expeditions against tlhc offend. 
ing tribes, me rn.ust now, and for the future, take 
advantage of them to settle our border line. We 
must, in future, wage Tar with each offending 
tribe. 'CVe must annex their hills, disarm the 
people, and reduce the clans to subjection. We 
must tell them that they are bad neighbonrs, not 
fit to be free; that we have tried them for twenty 
years, and found them habitually abu sing their 
independence; that they are no linger tolerab!e as 
neigl~bours; and that me now come to take their 
country under our rule, 2nd to redu-ce them to 
suJ ,jection. o n  their subjection. 
risoll located the 
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rison permanently located in the hills, the people 
disarmed, a proportion employed as militia and 
police, &c., &c., form elements in the settlement of 
the country, and the reconstruction of the frontier. 
We shall convert a set of lawless hill robbers into 
prosperous subjects and valuable soldiers. We 
shall supply all our frontier deficiencies and get 
rid of all our frontier troubles." 4u' . 
This, a t  least, is intelligible enough. Dr. Bel- 
lem's plan is not merely to hold the passes, but 
wholly to conquer and occupy the country of the 
hill tribes and thoroughly to keep them down. 
"My only objection to the plan is that he does not 
in the least attempt to show how this is to be 
done. ' ~ e  says '' Do it," and stops there. Evi- 
dently what he proposes is much easier said than 
done. It would no doubt be very desirable if it 
could be done, but we should have a good many 
very hard nuts to crack before we could do what 
he proposes. I have heard Afghanistan compared 
to our Scotch Highlands. I have heard it said, 
L L  You put down those troublesome Highlanders 
and turned their hills into delightful recreation 
and shooting grounds-why should not you put 
down the Afghan tribes in the same way?" Well, 
the objections are that Afghanistan is many times 
larger than the Highlands of Scotland, that the 
mountains are many times higher, that the people 
are far less amenable to authority, that we are 
many times more distant from our resources, that 
the resources and revenues of India are not in the 
same proportion as the resources and revenues of 
England, and that you can hardly carry the 
.Afghans across the .seas to colonize a new country 
as you clid with the Highlanders, when you substi- 
tuted sheep for men, and grouse for sheep, and 
deer for grouse. I confess I am not bold enough 
to recommend any such attempt in Afghanistan. 
d On the contrary, I am not for attacking the 
independent hill tribes at all. ' I t  seems to me that 
in the House of Commons the strong common-sense: 
of Mr. Burt, the Member for Morpeth, brought 
him very much to the point when he said, that 
proressing as me did to enter into.the war only to 
coerce the Arneer of Cabul, me really have 
expended most of our energies in fighting the 
independent peoples of Afghanistan. There can 
.be no doubt of this, that if we attempt a conquest 
of the tribes in order to obtain a scientific frontier, 
we must 'enter on a war which can hardly be said 
to have yet begun. As I have already remarked, 
our present positions have been mon as much by 
bribery as by fighting, So long as me do not do 
more than we have yet done, the tribes which have 
not specially suffered do not seem to take our pro- 
ceedings very much to heart ; in fact, they have 
something of the same feeling towards us which 
hunters may be supposed to have in regard to  an 
invasion of rich fur-bearing animals-they may do 
some damage at first, but i 
leave their skins behind 
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some damage at  first, but it is hoped that  they 
will leave their skins behind them in the end. A 
facetious Special Correspondent, the other day, 
telegraphed that there was a panic in Afghanistan 
upon the rumour that we were about to retreat. 
That, no doubt, was a pleasantry; but it is cer- 
tainly the case that if we were to  attempt to  
master the interior hills, the war would assume an 
entirely different character from anything that it 
has yet had, and the independent tribes would 
certainly fight very much better than they have 
yet fought. 
I assume, then, that the conquest of the tribes 
mill not be attempted; and i f  without that  
thorough measure the .occupation of such positions 
as General Roberts has taken is attended with 
such difficulties as Dr. Bellew has so vividly 
painted, we must look elsewhere for the scientific 
frontier. I am much convinced that if we 
advance at all we cannot again arrive at a scientific 
frontier till we reach the high country which I 
have described, lying further west. There, no 
doubt, it might be possible to establish a new 
frontier, beyond and commanding the hill8 and 
valleys of the eastern tribes, and situated in s 
country which mould admit of lateral communica- 
tions between one part and another. 
So long as we occupy just enough to irritate 
without isolatiiig and controlling the tribes, it 
must almost necessarily be that 'besides continually 
ha~*assing us, they will intrigue with Cabul, mue 
Cabul will intrigue with Russia, and our latter 
state will be worse than our first. We shall thus 
be in continual hot water till we are obliged 
self-defence, and under pressure of circumstances, 
to make a farther advance. I shall say something 
more of the advanced frontier when I come to the 
'' last resort." 
POSSIBLE ARRA NGIEMENTS. 
Now comes the question, "It is very easy to  
object to everything, but what mould you do ?" 
I am very clear as to what I mould have clone a 
little time ago, and that is-nothiy. Now that we 
are involved in the present complications, it is much 
more difficult to say what should be done, but I 
will try the best I can. 
I have hitherto said nothing of the Bolan pass, 
and Iwill now go to that part of the question. In 
fact, the Bolan is situated very differently from the 
other routes. The Sulimanee mountains, the 
habitat of the Eastern Afghans, and t h e  southern 
extremity of which is held by Belooch tribes, seem 
to come to a sudden end to the south, at a point 
between the 28th and 29th parallels of latitude. 
There seems to be there a sort of retrocession of 
the mountains. The high outer range disappears, 
and the plain conntry takes a long stretch to the 
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is. The high outer range disappears, 
n country takes a long stretch to the 
west. The Eolan pass, instead of running like the 
others fop a couple of hundred miles through the 
great outer barrier of mountains, 12,000 ft. to 
16,000 ft . high, consists of a much shorter ascent 
from the plains of Cutch-Gundava to the high 
quasi-plateau country. The route from Shikar- 
pore, near the Indus, to Dadar, at the foot of the 
Bolan pass, though easy enough in winter (the 
difficulty of obtaining carriage apart), is said to be 
very hot and unhealthy in summer, and to be very 
much flooded during the high Indus. But that 
part of the route would easily be surmounted by a 
not very expensive railway, which is certainly 
quite necesvary if we are to make a permanent 
advance in that direction. From Dadar upwards 
the first part of the route seems to be very gradual, 
and apparently there is only some thirty or forty 
miles of considerable ascent to Quettah, which is 
above the pass, at the height of 5500 ft. The 
country through which the hilly part ,of this route 
passes is a Belooch co~~n t ry  very sparsely inha- 
bited; and though not free from predatory habits, 
the Belooches are much more tractable and easy to 
manage than the Afghans. I n  fact, we have 
already both by treaty and by occupation complete 
access to the Belooch country, and there ~ o u i d  not 
be difficulty on that score. At Quettah we are in 
our right ; in occupying it we have clone that 
which we have full treaty right to do. That, at any 
,rate, is s great ad~~antage. Whatever objections 
I $l;rr4b hitlktbrto entertained to  any advance into 
c8 ktlrllriti?i ttthyo~ld the nnturnl limits of India, I 
r e i P r v c a c l  the question of Qoettah; and I am 
frkbq$ to nnft'sn that now that rve have gone so far, 
I tililik tll:rt $+ither Qucttah or some better canton- 
I l l r a n t  ill thnt part of the C Q U ~ ~ ~ Y  should be perma- 
rltarttlJ* r k*t*ul'iet l in strength and connected with 
Ilipli:r tlwinjrlghly efficient means of communicn- 
ti$.ram i c ~ ~ k  at the map and it mill be seen how 
cssra:l. qnlillllril?.ri cornmnnding a position this about 
[ . The border line of the Afghan hills, 
rvh14*)r ti.c,ni 12~shx1var to the southern  extremity of 
g l k t k  I 3 ~ l l ! j : ~ ~ t l )  runs nearly north and south, has here 
wr t:~r matn tccdrd, that Dndnr, on the edge of the 
i t l r l i g i s ,  i.; corlsiclernbly to the west of Cabul and 
( ;lkrlzl~cbc, while Quettah and the neigllbouring 
vailt*y td I'isllren are n long way west of those 
1 bE:bcc.*. Quet tall is infinitely nearer to Candah;tr 
tlrnl, arci Chtiznee and Cnbul. The Khoja Amran 
nn,gcb. ~vhich lies on the way to Cnndahar, is about 
;T(N 1 R. ~r lx~re thc sca, that is nearly 2200 ft. 
higl~rar tilati Quettah. KO doubt we should hold 
t*tarlklflftrltl of the routes up to that point, and from 
tllch~lce w e  should be in s position easily t o  descend 
nt any time to the valleys about Cmdahar. I 
mttu~t~t see then that there mould be any object in 
gc~irlp down to Candahar for the purpose of perma- 
11t '~~t ly  w~~ipyirig that place. We have s more 
dirthet ranto to G h z n e e  and Cabul over the high 
level colmtr~. without any great ascent or descent. 
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nrmngclnc~it. Furtlicr than that I C R ~ I I I O ~  V C I ~ ~ I ~ ~ C  
nn uljil~ion. for I linre no i~itimnts acqaniut:~nce 
wit11 the I<h~-l)cr tribes. 
I 11-olild certainly abandon the Kurram cou~ltry 
t i .  It sccms to lilt that the occnpntion 
of that n ,~l te  is cu~l)hnticnlly ~vhnt  I have bcforc 
~lcwribtrl as putting >*our hand into a hornet's nest 
n ~ i l l  i;c~pi~lg it there. This I<urmm ro~lte  takes 
us  infa the very lienrt and centre of the inclcpendent 
comitrj-. 1;stnblished there, ir7e slinll continually 
set  the whole nest of hornets in motion outside 
nnll inside; a-c shall continually come into collision 
with then1 througlioot our n-hole line of occupation; 
2nd cor~tilil~nll; they will retaliate upon us, on 
tlicir outer bortlers to~rxrds the Punjnub, as they 
1131-e :~lreadj: done. By all means let us avoid nil 
1)ositions ~vhicli bring us into collisioll with these 
t,ribcs, ~vlicrc it is possible to avoid it. 
Assuming, thcn, that we holcl the Bolan and 
Qocttall, and thc nlouth of the Iihyber, abandon 
nll other positions, and carefully abstain from 
hrthcr  irritntion of the tribes, I nrould then say 
that if wc cnrl find any Afghan government capable 
.of coming to terms with us and cont~olling the 
country, \re might accept the position sild make 
with that goTernrnent the t e rms  necessary to our 
security-viz., that wliilc the Afghans should have 
fit11 clolllestic independence, and should not b e  
~vorriecl mitli permanent Residents at  their head: 
quarters, they should gunmml t ec us free commnni- 
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Iiuwcvrr, ntc are ulrt:aiy :~lq~nrt~i~t ly n t itl ilt~+iritjn 
to put this (lu'bhtiolk t41 lltc tcit, so tll:bt I i ~ e r t l  not 
seek to argue it at ifd~igih. All I enn .S:IJ- is, tllat 
if sut:ll :I gtjvenuncllt :bs I il:ive dcscribctf can i ~ e  
fotual. ) ) jv  itll ine:rns let 1 1 .  a\-:ril oumcl~us of. it. 
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i~bc l f  witl10llt our aid. w h t  I ~i-,.uuId seek to press 
ill thr stntll,gtAst enris ~ v l ~ i c l i  I can c~>nno:rn~l is, 
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r~~flici(hlltIy bllows tlt:ct. S o  utie, I sho~iltl say7 car1 
rt::id 1111: histu~y of thc~sc (I:IJ.Y withollt being con- 
villced that we should h:nc iwcn i~d in i t c l~  mow 
likely to tadd the 1utii11 positio~ls ill the < ' : t l ~ ~ ~ j ,  
c o ~ i ~ i t r ~  if wc h:d dune ru our.icIrcs nithunt the 
iritcnlledi:ary uf that u ~ln~nnngec.nble p u p p  t tllc 
king, whom we set up? and wkosc ruis~unna~ane~r.  
went very i i~ r  to calise all the e-ril. \lye c o ~ d d  have 
dealt wit11 the tribes ourselves iufi~litely Lettcr 
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without our aid, let him do so; but establish him 
not by our aid, for if that is done the hand of every 
man in Afghanistan will be against him. This is 
the real difficulty in any negotiations with Takoob. 
No doubt poor Yakoob, in the unpleasant position 
he holds, will readily enough agree to terms with 
us ; but how is he to carry them out? If ever a 
man was, he is between the devil and the deep 
4 1 
sea. If he makes terms with us, he has a11 
Afghanistan against him ; if he does not, we are 
prepared to overturn his. It is on that account 
that I am very distrustful indeed of any arrange- 
ments which it may now be possible to make by 
negotiations with Yakoob or any one else who may 
take his place. 
The last telegrams from India seem to indicate 
that the Government have resolved to give up 
J - Candahar and Jellalabad, and so to cut short the 
occupation of two of the routes in a way which I 
think very prudent, if the upper country is not . 
to be occupied { but there remains the Kurram 
country, which General Roberts (no doubt acting 
under Lord Lytton's instructions) took upon 
himself to  annex without any authority from Her . 
Majesty's Government, as we have been distinctly 
told. It surely would be very weak indeed to 
maintain our hold of most enlbarrassing positions 
in order to support an act thus done without 
authority. The whole question now hinges upon 
that. So long as we insist on holding the Kurrarn 
5 "  
route, no anlicable settlement with the t#sibej 
possible, and any pretended settlement will only 
lead to fresli complicntions. 
Yakoob is said to hare accepted our terms; 
and many people jump to the conclusion that, this 
done, everything is settled. On the contrary, that 
is the beginning of difficulties. I t  rernni.11~ for 
Pakoob to assert his o m  position-to go back to 
Cabul and say, '' I have surrendered part of our 
territory ; I have accepted the demand for 
Residents ; I have yielded everything. Kom obey 
me; and having obeyed me, help me to recover the 
possessions of my father ~vhich have  re^-olted fro111 
me, to defeat Abdoor Rahman and all other rirnls, 
and to establish a stable government." I hardly 
expect to see such things effected. However, rvc 
shall soon see ; and if that fails, then our niorc 
serioris difficulties will comnlerlce. 
THE LAST RESORT. 
Failing any arrangement of the kind vhich I 
have just mentioned, I mould again say that in my 
opinion the difficulties and expenses of an occupa- 
tion of Afghanistan are so great that, rather that1 
undertake a more extensive occupation, I would 
Ieave the country to its fate, holding only Quettnh 
and the mouth of the Ehyber, and, trusting to  the 
chapter of accidents. I would risk the difficulties 
which rvould now no doubt attend this course rather 
degee dominate e. and. kb b k2 
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than face the greater difficulties which an extended 
occupation mus t  necessarily involve. But if this 
may not be-if Her Maj esty's Government are not 
prepared to retire to the line of the real Indian 
frontier-then in my view, far preferable to the 
half-and-half plan of holding the several routes 
through the most difficult and~troublesome parts of 
the country, would be the bolder, more thorough, 
and Inore scientific measure of going beyond the 
mountains and taldng up a position on the high 
land stretching froin Cabul through Ghuznee to 
Quettah. T h a t  is what I understand to be 
establishing a position beyond the mountain barrier, 
as recommended by Lord Napier of Magdala and 
others. Ghuznee, the culminating and commanding 
point of this tract, is the old historical centre from 
which the country has been commanded, so far as 
any previous dynasty has really commanded it. 
Prom the high line, of which Ghnznee is the centre, 
no doubt a strong force would command the passes 
from Central Asia on the one side, and in some 
degree dominated and isolate the independent 
Afghan tribes on the other side. 
If we thus isolate, as it were, the country of the 
independent tribes, then I think there is no reason 
whatever why we should seek to deprive them of 
their independence, and of those d'eenro~ocratic institu- 
tions which a r e  their birthright. On the contrary, I 
would encourage them to develope those indigenous 
self-governing institutions, democratic though they 
be, vhich form the ancient lam of the Afghan race. 
Under the shadow of our external military pro- 
tection I would foster those institutions and would 
seek to establish an Afghan Republic or congeries 
of Republics. ' It has always seemed strange to me 
that we, who so much pride ourselves on our 
popular institutions, appear to be the last to recog- 
nize anything of the kind among other peoples. 
We  seem always in the habit of supposing that all 
over the world the absolute power of despotic rule 
is the natural state of things, though nothing can 
be more contrary to the facts. Our conduct in 
India, in Turkey, and in Egypt, seems to have 
been throughout guided by that belief ; and in 
Afghanistan, which is, as I have said, one of the 
most democratic countries in  the world, the 
greatest danger seems to be in the idea that if me 
can only find or establish a kiug and come to 
terms with him, a11 will be settled.' One mould 
have thought, as I have already said, that our ex- 
perience of 1641 might have cured us of that 
delusion. So far then as regards all the country 
east of Ghuznee, the course which I mould follow 
is to isolate it and make it self-governing and 
independent. I would hold the Bolan and Khyber 
routes, but not the Kurram. The Goleree route 
we might hope to keep open for mercantile pur- 
poses only. On the other hand, as regards all the 
remainder of the country really Afghan, that is the 
districts about Candahar and thence westward, 
consisting principally of t 
view mould be that as tl 
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habit of supposing that all 
lute power of despotic rule 
things, though nothing can 
he facts. Our conduct in 
in Egypt, seems to have 
~d by that belief ; and in 
as I have said, one of the 
'tries in the world, the 
o be in the idea that if we 
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;ht have cured us of that 
as regards all the country 
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11 allen for mercantile pur- 
her l~and, as regards all the 
ry redly Afghan, that is the 
ilnr and thence westward, 
consisting principally of the Durnnee country, my 
T ~ C I ~  would be that as these western tribes have 
beell more sccustomed to some sort of kingly rule, 
and the family of Dost >lil~homecl are now really 
the chiefs of the Durnnees, I mould give every 
facility to yalioob, or any other member of the 
finnily who may be more acceptable to the people, 
to establish himself as reigning chief of the 
Iluranees, with the possessio~l of Cnudahar and all 
the Durance districts and dependencies. Herat 
is hardly properly included in these terms, but 
that part of the valley of the Harirood seems 
properly to belong to no other tribe or nationality, 
and exposed ns it is to depredations by the hi11 
men, it could hardly be independent ; so I mould 
seek to make that also a dependency of the 
IUuranee chief of' Cftndahrtr. With that chief I 
mould rn:rke tho terms I hove before snggested- 
domestic independence, but political depetldelice 
zlyoll us. 
At Cnbnl we should come illto close contact with 
the IZol~istmees and Hazarehs of the hill country 
to the north and west, and might milre skparate 
arra~lge~nents directly with them ; as likewise with 
the people of Baduksharl and the neighbouring 
principalities, who are, ns I have esglained, of the 
same Persian race as the Kohistanees. I ~vould 
give to these countries the form of government 
which the people are foulid to like best. Possibly 
some of them might even prefer our rnle if fairly 
aitaliilrtist~ra~~l witE~ tlue ~ o ~ ~ ~ i ~ l ~ r ~ t i c ~ ~ i  to  tljleir T J * ~ L I ~ ~ Y  
malal .r~irE1c,cs. Ehth tlke I<t+lnist:anccs n~ld  11:iznrchs 
hnrr. I think. the rcput:ition of 1)eing troublesome 
R ~ I C ~  ditiickilt tc.) ill:illwtl in rheir o ~ c n  hills, but all 
this very ~nticbh dvl,e~~du upon ethriologicnl consi- 
derntick~ls, rclrl wc ticrrbr can tell llom far n people 
arta irtncrlnl,le to tjuiut rl~ltr till they hare becu 
fitiriy tried wit11 it. I may t:~lic ns :in illstarice of 
tlris r hv cssrlll~lc of Olrdc.. I5ecause that country 
1 1  1 t i t  I r mud-fort r n~ld giwn 
tllr t u  estrr?lnv i:rrvlcssneas, tliu bclicf ~ m s  enter- 
lake. It. .rr:is under the influence of that belief 
t113t, Lord Cl:-d~ Ijci~lg C S C ~ S S ~ V C I ~  nxlxiolls to 
fi~iihh the inuriiiy c:~mpnign? tcrrns ~ ~ e r c  p i~cn  to 
tht? 'I':bloukars Ivi-itl~ arms still in thcir hands? but 
r~:illy t rcmilling fur their lives, ~ ~ h i c l l  ~vr-ere very 
t~uniilinting to us, n ~ l d  a great political blunder. 
This rtctiun ir-tis the result of nn ethnological 
~iliut:\kc. Those of us who krle~v the people kxiew. 
that they mcrc the same as their cogeners of the 
tlistricfs of Clude wliich we nnzlesed at the 
brginili~lg uf the century, and t h g  haw in fact 
prowd us quirt ns any sheep. So it migllt not 
itnprobnbly be that the Iiollistnuees axld IIuzsrehs 
~cllo occupy the great Caucasin~i range, which is 
after all the real barrier ag1iust in\-asion from 
Central Asia, might pro\-e amenable enough. I 
c:c1111ot s u p p ~  that such good honest labourers as 
the H:vzarchs w e  not amenable to Cqir mallage- 
merit at home ; and thl 
ererywhese a quiet goo( 
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uc:isian range, which is 
ngr~inst invasion from 
c wnrnnble enough. I 
rood lionest inbourers as 
erli~blc to fair manage- 
m a t  at home ; and the old Pe~sian  race are 
everywhere a quiet good people whom it is not 
very difficult to  control. They give no trouble to 
their rulers either in Afghanistan. or in Turkestan, 
and probably might be brought to reasonable self- 
government, in Eohistan and Badukshan, if they 
are protected and encouraged. 
1 have little doubt then that if me must advance 
on Cabul and Ghuznee, and can find the finances 
necessary for the maintenance of our position 
there, we should really command the great 
Caucasian barrier towards the north without 
encountering those insuperable difficulties which 
seem to attend the occupation of any properly 
Afghan country. 
In  the event of such an occupation of the 
strategical positions in Afghanistan as I have con- 
templated in the last resort, I think we should pro- 
claim that t o  all those who can in any way 
successfully govern themselves, we shall give self- 
government in the form which is most acceptable 
to each people, and that we shall ask them for no 
revenue or tribute, and shall not interfere in their 
domestic affairs, unless it be to arbitrate between 
them either at their request or where internal 
5 disorders render such interference absolutely 
necessary. On the other hand, we may in some 
sort bribe them into acpiescence, while utilizing 
them for our own purposes, by offering to many of 
them military and other serlice under ourselves. 
and regulate tribes ' 
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 node of travelling-namely, being carried in a 
creel upon a woman's back. 
I hardly hope that the Afghans would settle 
down as readily. No doubt they mould less 
readily brook our interference; but grad~~ally a 
settlement might be effected, and I should not 
despair that as they gain co~lfidence and belief in 
our desire to let them govern themselves for thek 
own benefit, tlieir country might become accessible 
to us like any other country. 
The great difficulty of such a plan as I hare 
proposed is of course the expense. That no doubt 
would be very considerable. And we should 
practically derive no revenue from the country, for 
any little that we might collect from the few 
.districts directly occupied by ourselves would be 
expended on the local administration. For myself 
I see no objection on principle to making India pay 
for undertakings which are connected with India 
and are in some sort intended for the benefit of 
India. The mother country pays more than her 
shwe of the expenses of the empire : me do what 
we can for India, and India might fairly enough 
pay her share if she only had the money ; but then, 
as a matter of fact, she has not the money. Her 
people are undoubtedly very poor. The more I , 
see of other countries, the more I realize the 
poverty of India and the cruelty of taxing the 
people more than me can help. The position of 
Illdinll finance is unfi 
hope of a surpltls, 
fairly raise more t a  
fashioned style of gc 
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:.it I 1 4 8 .  thtttc:lty crf taxing the 
; + ,  Thc position of 
Izldiaxl finance is unfortunately such that there is 
no hope of s surplus, and I do not see that we can 
fairly raise more taxes in return for the old- 
fi~shioned style of govemmlent. If it be possible 
still to raise some further rates or taxes, I think 
that these should only be obtained, as has lately 
been done, as a means of paying 'for additio~~al 
benefits evident to the people, the money being, in 
fact, expended by themselves. I f  Afghanistan were 
occupied in the way I have mentioned, some con- 
siderable saving might be effected in the military 
expenses in India itself, Afghanistan being hence- 
forth the frontier fortification by which India is 
shielded and the troops there held ready to send 
to India, in case of an emergency. The money 
thus saved in India would be a fair contribution 
towards the expense of Afghanistan; but no more 
than this could be derived from India, and any 
further expenses England mould have to piy. 
But after all, this is a rich country, not very 
heavily taxed; and if we mould really have a 
spirited foreign policy, great foreign dominions, 
and a '  strong military position, I believe that the 
occupation of Afghanistan mould be an important 
step t o m d s  that object. I speak of the perma- 
nent position of this country apart from the 
present depression ; for after all, despite the 
depression of our industries, me still have capital 
-money is cheap-the yield of the income-tax 
does not fail. We still are, md may hope to 
remain, the money-lenders of the world. We can 
bear  ell enough another penny in the pound 
upon property if we mould have the great position 
I have mentioned. 
I t  is better, too, that -ive should honestly realize 
the fact that whether from the inherent difficulties 
of our position, or whether from not fully and 
properly carlying out the system adopted, our 
present military arrangements are a faillure ; or, at 
any rate, even if me have made a successf~~l com- 
mencement of the plan of increasing our resenes 
at home, they are a failure as regards foreign ser- 
vice. The difficulty of supplying a great army in 
India under the short-service system has never 
been fairly faced; and on the occurrence of the 
Iate African emergency there has been made pain- 
fully manifest our entire failure to keep even a 
few battalions in an efficient state as the next on 
the roster for foreign service. On the other hand, 
since the mutiny we have been afraid to employ 
too many Indian soldiers. We really have not a, 
great native army in India as compared to the 
country, and the greater part of what me have is 
not really efficient for severe or foreign service. 
So it is that having one war. on our hands in India, 
me have been obliged to send heavy dragoons and 
imperfect regiments of English boys to Africa 
instead of the light Indian regiments, which, with 
a nucleus of Europeans, would have been far 
better fitted for the service. Afghanistan would 
certnirily offer us sew 
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7'0 stiln up. JIy ~ i e w  is 'iery decidedly thnt we 
c:ll~~lot witllnnt grmt coinpiication n~id  ctisturbn1ic.e 
huh1 our prescnt position in Afghanistnn ; that rye 
re:dly nmst citllrr go back or go  forward. I an1 
collriliccll th:it to crlt:lniglc ourselves in the tliost 
diflitbult part of the hills, and to  hold a succession 
01' n ~rltcs t l~rougb t hosc hills ~ ~ i t h o u t  holding the 
high ln~lds nhovc, is qrlitc the worst policy of dl. 
lislwt1i:rlly I tliilik tlmt tllc occlipntiorl of Iiurrixm 
Ji host :nu1 thc so-c:~llecl routc! that rvny to C:L)JIII, in 
thr! vcrv l u w t  and centre of the real Afg1i:inistnn 
uf thc Sfghnnr;, and surrounded by t*he rnost 
troal,lesoinc of t he  independent tribcs, ~ ~ o o l d  bc 
thie greatest possible rnistqke. Let us choose then 
orit? of two nlternntirc plans-an Indian or an 
Afglla~~hnll frontier. hl the one case we m t ~ a t  con- 
ecntrstc our forces and call off' General Roberts, 
lye niust riot irritate, but conciliate the tribes; and 
if me are not to surround and isolate them, the best 
solution is t o  leave then1 alone as much as possible, 
and not push ourselres among them. In  that case, 
still holding Quettah. let us try again, if we will, 
the possibility of an Bfgbnn s h t e  sucli as that of 
the late She 
access t o  Bal 
nleniioned* 
m ~ ~ t l y  fear t 
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t the occupation of Kurram 
!d route that way to Cabul, in 
l t re  of the real Afghanistan 
1 surrounded by the most 
ndependent tribes, would be 
uistake. Let us choose then 
iye plans-an Indian or an 
the one case we must con- 
nd call off General Roberts. 
jjut conciliate the tribes; and 
~ n d  and isolate them, the best 
?m alone as much as possible, 
8 imong them. In that cage, 
let us try again, if we will, 
ifghfin state such as that of. 
the lnte Wlere Ali, claiming to ourselves only 
access to Ball& an8 the other terms which I have 
mentiotled. Failing that armngement - md I 
greatly fear that it must fail,-then f-or my part I 
would leave Afghanistnn alone, and see ~h-hnt may 
come. If that may not be, then I come to the 
pla11 which I ha\-e described as c L  The Lnst 
Resort," that is, do not try to coilquer the inde- 
pendent tribes, but isolate them, and protect the111 
in the exercise of their indigenous institutio~~s. 
Give up the played-out ltingdonl of Cabul, 31111 
boldly take up a central and comumnding positioll 
en the high ground about Ghuznee and Cabbul, 
com~nunlicat~ing with I~~cldis by the Bolnn n11tl 
I<.hyber routes. Let us then put ourselves iu 
direct comu~u~icat ion with the nlorc aulennble 
peoples beyond our positions, coilt yo1 them, secure 
our frontier, and add new races of soldiers to our 
army. If this must be done, i t  is probably better 
that it sho~lld be clone so011 than later. 
Such a policy mould no doubt be a fine, I mny 
say-s ma,@ficent game. Holding India in s 
stronger and more dignified may, if our possessioll 
of part of Burmah should some day involve n 
further adrnnce in  that direction, rye should haTe 
the necessary troops. I f  events are really tending 
to foyce upon us a great African empire, we might 
draw from our Asiatic possessions the troops best 
fitted for skch an undertaking. And if me nmst 
hold a, great positlion in the Xediterranean, me 
lilig,.lit hasc a Lctter chance of doing so than n-hell. 
hst p a r ,  we seut n sitlglc tlirision of native trool~r 
there. Such n policy ~ ~ o u l t l  i n r o l ~ ~ e  the abando11- 
~ncrlt of h:df measures- it would bc intelligible 
c.llonyrl4 nud rtliglit be temptiug enou yh-bu t it lllust 
Ire :m espc.usive and risky policy. I only throw it 
~ t l t  3 s  tlic oltenlntire to be co~lsiclered in the lrcry 
1 s t .  I all1 IIIJ-SPU nll for econo1113', pence, and 
t l ~ t i ~ t  : k t  home, nlld ~vould only seek to hold indin 
h~ long as we cnxl do so wi-itllout Leing forced into 
:u.ulr itioos pnljects i~cydnd the Indim i~orctcrs. 
I - l hat ~ir-ils luy view in 18-49, and that is my view 
in1 1S7lb. 
